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Abstract In the 1950s, when the issue concerning Nansha Qundao was highlighted, the British government discussed how to deal with the position of Nanwei Dao and Anbo Shazhou which were historically relevant. However, the unanimous opinion of the British government was that the “sovereignty” proposal was invalid due to a weak legal basis, which has been expressed in foreign exchanges. In response to the Nansha issue, on the one hand, the British government neither recognized any other sides claim on Nansha Qundao, nor publicly renounced claim on the two islands; on the other hand, it holds a neutral stance and did not interfere in the Nansha Qundao issue, while in the actual analysis, it gave tacit consent to the fact that sovereignty over the two islands belongs to China, and questioned the claim made by the Philippines and the authorities from South Vietnam. In the context that the United Kingdom is losing out in Southeast Asia, Britain had gradually to step out of the stage on the Nansha Qundao issue, considering its lack of any real geographical interest in Nansha Qundao. However, collection and analysis of certain intelligence made by relevant British departments could contribute to an objective understanding of the situation in the South China Sea and stances of other sides. Unlike the containment strategy of the United States, the United Kingdom made its own stance over the South China Sea on the basis of geopolitical drives, which reflected its autonomy in decisionmaking concerning the South China Sea.
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