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Abstract In the process of jointly building the “Polar Silk Road”, there is an interest game between China and Russia. Based on the subjective game theory, the authors make an analysis of the game from both shortterm and long⁃term perspectives. In the short run, jointly building is the dominant strategy for both countries, so cooperation and jointly building the “Polar Silk Road” is bound to be the equilibrium of the game.In the long term, changes in external conditions and endogenous accumulations of the game will make a difference to the strategic choice of Russia. Therefore, Russia may deviate from the short⁃term game equilibrium, which could damage China's investments in building the “Polar Silk Road”. According to the analysis, the authors further propose that China should coordinate policy with Russia, focus on interests of cooperation between Russia and China, and implement strategies of staged investment and enhancing cultural exchanges to ensure that Russian does not deviate from the short⁃term game equilibrium in the long⁃term game, so as to safeguard the long⁃term interests of China in jointly building the “Polar Silk Road”.
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2019, Vol. 27 
