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Abstract Summary:
In recent years, China’s economic rise has been perceived by Japan as a threat to its national security interests as a result of an intensifying great power rivalry and a widening power gap between the two countries. Japan believes that this trend will result in the emergence of unfavorable regional orders. Consequently, Japan believes it is necessary to collaborate with the United States and other like-minded countries to formulate new rules and norms aimed at constraining China.
Against this background, Japan has begun a new focus on addressing the issue of economic coercion against China. Three main strategies are identified in Japan’s promotion of the anti-economic coercion issue. Firstly, multilateral coordination involves Japan in seeking alliances with like-minded countries to establish rules and norms that counter China’s economic influence. Secondly, shaping public opinions aims to portray China’s economic actions as coercive statecraft and to rally international support for Japan’s stance. Thirdly, domestic capacity building encompasses its measures to enhance Japan’s resilience against economic coercion and to prepare for potential economic conflicts.
By the end of August 2023, following China’s retaliatory measures against Japan’s decision to discharge nuclear-contaminated water into the sea, Japan had immediately resorted to the confrontation through the anti-economic coercion issue. Rather than concentrating on its own crisis, it wanted to demonstrate both domestically and internationally the necessity and effectiveness of so-called anti-China’s economic coercion.
The study concludes by discussing the implications of Japan’s anti-economic coercion strategy on Sino-Japan relations and the international community. It suggests that Japan’s narrative, while aimed at containing China, is characterized by double standards and instrumentalism, diverging from the principles of multilateralism. The need for a more nuanced understanding of economic security and cooperation is emphasized, along with a call for a reevaluation of Japan’s strategic approach in the context of the global economic order.
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