Developing area studies represents a demand on Chinese higher education institutions as the country becomes a key global player. Area studies have traditionally followed two distinct models exemplified by the United States and Europe. The US model emphasizes cross-discipline collaborations and multi-disciplinary perspectives, while the European model tends to integrate disciplinary approaches to form area studies program. Clearly, there is a need to emphasize the multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and regional characteristics, facilitating the integration of area studies with various disciplines in the humanities, social sciences, as well as language and cultural studies. Research in area studies should actively apply new methodologies that have emerged in the general social sciences in recent years, while also understanding the forefront debates within these disciplines. Moreover, area studies should place great importance to field-based research and small-N case studies and in-depth studies.

Why do semiconductor mega-corporations display differences in their strategic choices between China and the U.S.? The existing research has insufficiently examined the decision-making mechanism of high-tech mega-corporations in the context of great power competitions over science and technology. The strategic choices of mega-corporations are affected by their external relations between great powers and their own attributes of “economic man” and “political man”. When great powers cooperate well with each other, the logic of “economic man” prevails, and thus mega-corporations could make their decisions independently in the global market and rationally pursue the maximization their profits. When the great powers compete or even move towards confrontation, the logic of “political man” prevails, and the strength of the “political man” attribute would influence how to deal with the U.S. political coercion, and thus determine whether or not it would move on to the next stage of economic man’s decision. The strategic choices of TSMC, NVIDIA, and ASML can provide empirical evidences for this analytical framework. This study contributes to the understanding of the decision-making mechanisms of high-tech mega-corporations in the context of U.S. technological competition with China, and it is also instructive for China and Chinese corporations to analyze the behavioral logic of their partners and competitors in the era of technological changes.

Summary: In recent years, China’s economic rise has been perceived by Japan as a threat to its national security interests as a result of an intensifying great power rivalry and a widening power gap between the two countries. Japan believes that this trend will result in the emergence of unfavorable regional orders. Consequently, Japan believes it is necessary to collaborate with the United States and other like-minded countries to formulate new rules and norms aimed at constraining China. Against this background, Japan has begun a new focus on addressing the issue of economic coercion against China. Three main strategies are identified in Japan’s promotion of the anti-economic coercion issue. Firstly, multilateral coordination involves Japan in seeking alliances with like-minded countries to establish rules and norms that counter China’s economic influence. Secondly, shaping public opinions aims to portray China’s economic actions as coercive statecraft and to rally international support for Japan’s stance. Thirdly, domestic capacity building encompasses its measures to enhance Japan’s resilience against economic coercion and to prepare for potential economic conflicts. By the end of August 2023, following China’s retaliatory measures against Japan’s decision to discharge nuclear-contaminated water into the sea, Japan had immediately resorted to the confrontation through the anti-economic coercion issue. Rather than concentrating on its own crisis, it wanted to demonstrate both domestically and internationally the necessity and effectiveness of so-called anti-China’s economic coercion. The study concludes by discussing the implications of Japan’s anti-economic coercion strategy on Sino-Japan relations and the international community. It suggests that Japan’s narrative, while aimed at containing China, is characterized by double standards and instrumentalism, diverging from the principles of multilateralism. The need for a more nuanced understanding of economic security and cooperation is emphasized, along with a call for a reevaluation of Japan’s strategic approach in the context of the global economic order.

While climate foreign aid is an emerging field of China’s South-South cooperation, it is an important way for China to participate in global climate governance. The institutional arrangements of climate foreign aid are rooted in the socialism with Chinese characteristics, forming a “three-dimensional structure” of the organizational, guiding and regulatory institution of climate foreign aid. Currently, China’s climate foreign aid is faced with new situations such as the escalation of the political and economic competitions among the major powers, the increasing downward pressure on the global economy and the transformation of global climate governance. It is necessary to contribute to the function of climate diplomacy, ensure the supply of climate resources, and respond to global climate threats through the institutions of climate foreign aid. At present, there are still shortcomings and deficiencies in the institutions of climate foreign aid, and it is necessary to optimize the organizational institutions, improve the guiding institutions, and promote the regulatory institutions. This theoretical analysis and optimization plan could provide institutional theoretical approaches or optimization options for China’s foreign aid, and also provide institutional experience for the improvement of China’s foreign aid.

Climate change has become one of the greatest concerns of small island states, but most of them are constrained by their development and are dependent on assistance and supports from others to cope with the impacts of climate change. Such a need has become more urgent in recent years. In the 2023 Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union Treaty, Tuvalu received climate assistance from Australia at a high price, including access to Tuvalu’s foreign and security affairs. The potential impacts of climate change on the international legal personality of small island states and their rights to the maritime areas are an important entry point for understanding the true motivations for the treaty. More notably, the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union Treaty reflects a trend in the practice of some major powers to use climate assistance as a fulcrum for deeper involvement in the internal and external affairs of small island states. If this kind of climate cooperation evolves from an isolated case into a fixed paradigm, the major powers will continue to expand their influence over small island states. Other small island states will have to seek refuge in the major powers for their own survival, and the regional organizations established by the small island states to fight against the control of the major powers will be dismantled. These situations will change the current geopolitical landscape of the small island regions. The game between major powers and small island states in dealing with climate change will also have a potential impact on China’s promotion of in-depth cooperation with small island states. In view of this, China should, from the basic position of respecting state sovereignty and independence, resist the practice of intervening in the internal and external affairs of small island states in the name of climate cooperation, actively provide the small island states with targeted climate change coping programs and promote its climate diplomacy.

Currently, the deep-sea infrastructure, such as submarine cables, submarine data centers and equipment for seabed resource extraction, has been receiving widespread attention. The international community’s inability to control competitions over the deep-sea infrastructure poses the risk of conflicts erupting in the field of global deep-sea infrastructure. Deep-sea infrastructure governance has been becoming an emerging and urgent challenge for global ocean governance. At the same time, the internal factors of deep-sea infrastructure have also aggravated the difficulty of international deep-sea space governance. The rapid development of global deep-sea infrastructure urgently requires the international community to shape reasonable infrastructure rules and a strict control mechanism. But, the lack of relevant rules will affect the international situation, and it may become a constraint on building a maritime community with a shared future. As an important force in global ocean governance, China should be guided by the concept of building a maritime community with a shared future, actively lead the construction of international rules of deep-sea infrastructure, and promote the institutionalization and standardization of global deep-sea infrastructure governance.

Having been the critical infrastructure in the fields of communication and energy transmission, the significance of submarine cables and pipelines has been widely recognized by the international community. Given that a substantial portion of submarine cables and pipelines are controlled by private investors, international investment law plays an irreplaceable role in protecting them. International legal instruments such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provide an international legal basis for ensuring protection for investments. However, due to the cross-border nature of submarine cables and pipelines, as well as the inadequacy of legal regimes of governing them in both international and domestic laws, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the applicability of international investment agreements and the implementation of specific investment treatment. States should emphasize the interactive relationship between international investment law and other legal rules of governing submarine cables and pipelines. Based on this, targeted legal frameworks should be designed within existing international investment agreements, international law, and national laws and regulations to effectively protect submarine cables and pipelines.