The global civilization view of the Communist Party of China in the new era internalizes the general requirements of civilization development based on its internal and external contexts, and also integrates the Chinese discourse of inclusiveness and global vision, realizing the transcendence of the Western civilization view. It follows the ontological logic of the dialectical unity of the general commonality and national identity of human civilization, and adheres to the theoretical logic of combining Marxism with the fine traditional culture. It is the historical consciousness of the Communist Party of China remaining the global vision, and also a realistic response to the influence of the highlighting of civilization values and the intensification of clash of civilization. It takes building a Human Community with a Shared Future as its overall goal, practicing the Humanitys Common Values as its common guideline, respecting the diversity of civilizations as its basic principle, valuing the inheritance and innovation of civilization as its important driving force, and strengthening international cultural exchanges and cooperation as its practical path. It highlights the strong sense of responsibility of the Communist Party of China in promoting the progress in human civilization, and has great significance in promoting theoretical innovation in international relations, promoting world peace and development, strengthening global civilization governance, and building a human community with a shared future.

Maritime feature is the decisive factor for the Indo-Pacific region embodied with great geostrategic importance. The QUAD kicked off an initiative named the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), which aims at enforcing the collection and sharing of the information and data concerning maritime environment in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and Pacific Islands, as well as capacity building in coastal countries. From a long-term perspective, the IPMDA also can be used to establish the rules of the maritime activities in the region. The initiative has obvious characteristics, such as targeting on China’s maritime activities, being dominated by the U.S. and relying on allies and partners’ collaboration. As its pilot projects implemented, the IPMDA is placing cutting-edge technologies into the real-time maritime situation awareness in Indo-Pacific and enforcing information dissemination by creating innovative platforms. Meanwhile, the initiative is promoting capacity-building in the fields of data dissemination, law enforcement and military collaboration among partner countries. Its implications on the balance of regional maritime power, orders construction and China’s activities are emerging. Although it has potentials to grow, the future of the IPMDA will be limited by various uncertainties, which proofs reversely that the safety and security of the region require cooperative efforts from all stakeholders but not special initiatives or arrangements for dividing the region into two camps.

Projecting and constructing a systematic security arrangement that includes the security force under the framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is an issue proposed several times by the ASEAN countries while it has not been achieved yet. Existing research offers some explanations for the individual effects of the ASEAN way, the ASEAN countries’ capabilities, or the impacts of major powers without providing a testable comprehensive analytical framework. Then, why has the ASEAN not yet built up its security force as an institutional arrangement? This article argues that three factors exert important impacts on the preferences and motivations of the ASEAN countries for the ASEAN security force: the ASEAN’s leadership, the external validity of the ASEAN regional resilience, and the convergence of the ASEAN countries’ security demands. We argue further that only when all these factors are situated in a condition simultaneously where there is a consensus between the ASEAN countries on the ASEAN leadership, the relatively high level of external validity of the ASEAN regional resilience, as well as an increasingly convergent view on the security priorities within Southeast Asia, then there would be a significant improvement on the ASEAN countries’ preference for the ASEANlevel security force. In this case, the ASEAN security force is more likely to be projected and arranged. With this theoretical framework, we further analyze the ASEAN’s relatively unsuccessful pursuit of the security force in its history in different phases including the Cold War phase (1967-1991), the memberships enlargement phase (1992-2003), and the highspeed development phase (2004present) respectively. We find that the relatively low level of external validity of the regional resilience, the disagreement on the leading country in the field of security within the ASEAN, and the decreasing trend of convergence on the security demands among the ASEAN countries are challenges for the ASEAN security force construction for the abovementioned three phases. In the future, the projection and construction of an ASEANlevel security force would remain an open question to both the ASEAN countries and other countries with great interests in Southeast Asia. However, it is noteworthy to investigate alternative approaches to security cooperation among the ASEAN and other countries to make the stability of Southeast Asia durable.

The Biden administration is committed to reshaping the supply chain of critical minerals in the IndoPacific region. Its aims include weakening China’s industrial capacity, promoting the derisking China’s supply chains and enhancing the ability of the US and its allies to capture the interests of global mineral markets. The arrangements of the US is characterized by building an interconnected network of mechanisms based on bilateral cooperation mechanisms, developing the strategic tendency to contain China based on geopolitical logic and promoting the industry rules led by the U.S.. However, the arrangements of the U.S. face many constraints in the conflict of interest demands among allies and partner countries. Second, the U.S. lacks the willingness and ability to provide public goods for the developing countries in the region. Third, the U.S. is trying to involve the IPEF member states in containing China, but some of them want to maintain their strategic autonomy. Despite this, the attempt of the U.S. to restructure the supply chain of critical minerals in the IndoPacific region will increase the risk of overseas supply of China’s critical minerals, and have a negative impact on the investment projects of Chinese enterprises in regional countries and China's position in the global industrial chain. However, the investment cooperation and industrial collaboration between China and regional countries in the field of critical minerals will play an important role in mitigating such negative impacts.

Fisheries subsidies are an important tool for countries to support fisheries development, while the resulting problem of overfishing has become a pressing concern. On June 17, 2022, the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies was adopted at the 12th Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO), marking a significant achievement in the international fisheries subsidies negotiations over the past 20 years. As the first WTO multilateral agreement aimed at achieving environmental sustainability goals, the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies promotes the sustainable utilization of fisheries resources and the protection of marine ecosystems and biodiversity by reducing harmful fisheries subsidies. Looking ahead, this Agreement provides a template for global discussions on trade and environmental issues. While pushing for the eventual implementation of this Agreement, WTO members will continue negotiations on pending issues. For China, the implementation of this Agreement offers opportunities more than challenges, aiding the country in achieving highquality sustainable development in fisheries, actively participating in global fisheries governance, and engaging in the discussions on the WTO trade and environmental issues. China should actively fulfill its commitments under this Agreement and constructively participate in the negotiation of pending issues, putting forward proposals that align with its core interests.

With the rapid development of deepsea technology and equipment, the intensification of deepsea resource competition, the lag of deepsea military control mechanisms, and the need for comprehensive management of the ocean and potential sea battles, major military powers are accelerating the construction of deepsea combat systems, attempting to turn most of the deepsea areas from a public domain state into a new onedimensional battlefield, in order to seek control over deepsea areas, which will accelerate the development of militarization in the global deepsea region. The acceleration of militarization in global deepsea region will in turn promote a leap in deepsea technology, thereby driving the improvement of national ocean military strength and comprehensive national strength, and expanding the space for national development. At the same time, this acceleration will intensify the deepsea arms race, violating the basic principles and spirit of international ocean peaceful utilization, and greatly increasing the risk of major powers’ war. However, due to the significant investment in the development of deepsea militarization, the potential risks from widespread application of artificial intelligence technology and the harsh geographical and fragile ecological environment of the deepsea will also pose constraints and challenges to the accelerated development of deepsea militarization.

As critical infrastructure, undersea cables are becoming the focus of great powers and a new perspective to analyse the U.S. strategic approach towards China. Undersea cables have existed throughout the history of great power rivalry, during which the U.S. has repeatedly used it to attack its opponents. Undersea cables expand the dimension of great power infrastructure rivalry and has the developmentsecuritytechnologyspace nexus. Undersea cables have higher technical requirements and are the key to the Fourth Technological Revolution. Having been located in deep sea, undersea cables lack effective supervision and are more vulnerable to risks. The U.S. rivalry with China on undersea cables is mainly based on national security considerations. At the same time, it hopes to use undersea cables to suppress Chinese companies and reduce their market share, as well as maintaining technological dominance and deep sea hegemony. The U.S. competitive measures include forcing undersea cables to suspend construction or bypass China, cooperating with allies and partners to exclude Chinese companies from undersea cable market, restricting the export of undersea cable technology to China, and developing offensive undersea capabilities to attack China’s undersea cables. The rivalry between the U.S. and China on undersea cables will lead to a dual structure in the digital field and increase the difficulty of global digital governance. Besides, the rivalry will be detrimental to the improvement of connectivity in IndoPacific states and the growth of local enterprises. It will also weaken the strategic stability between the U.S. and China, which increasing the risk of accidental occurring in deep sea.