This paper constitutes an attempt to investigate China’s OBOR project and the prospects for greater Eurasian economic and political integration. It compares China’s development-oriented strategy in Europe with the security-driven strategy of the US and investigates how the two paradigms relate to present-day international relations, holding that China’s Eurasian program provides Europe with an alternative for the security-oriented Atlanticism. It argues that, by introducing an essential developmentalist agenda in the Eurasian economic and political context, the OBOR project promotes multipolarity, mutual trust, greater economic prosperity, easing of security concerns and a new developmentalist discourse, which may eventually lead to the weakening of Atlanticist alliance. However, it recognizes that, aside from the fact that the material and ideational fundamentals of Atlantic alliance remain strong, China’s Eurasian drive will likely encounter numerous challenges as the OBOR program expands.
The Paris Agreement, a New Global Climate Governance, and China’s Choice
The Kyoto Model of Climate governance was marked by its ineffectiveness. Under the Kyoto Impasse, the political structure and norms of the multilateral climate negotiations have gone through an incremental but substantial change. In the meantime, sub- and non-state climate governance regimes have also expanded globally. In this context, the Paris Agreement that was achieved in 2015 served as a major institutional input that may strengthen or alter existing trends of global climate governance. The Paris Agreement institutionalized a series of new consensus among states that were reached through several rounds of negotiations prior to the global submit in 2015. It turned the global emission reduction system from one based on North-South separation to one based on universal but voluntary burden sharing. In addition, the Paris Agreement granted legitimacy and authority to sub- and non-state climate governance initiatives, promoted global economic decarbonization. This may certainly open a new ground for major power competition over clean technology, products’ emission standards, low carbon economic rules, and so on. China should be ready to both adapt and to construct the changing global climate governance system. It should accelerate the decarbonization of its national economy, while also seeking to promote the diffusion and authorization of Chinese plans, standards, rules for climate governance.