The current game between China and the US mainly focuses on the reconstruction of regional order, that is, the competition between the “Chinese Approach” and the “Free and Open Indo⁃Pacific”(FOIP) strategy of the US. In order to gain support from ASEAN countries, the US recognizes ASEAN’s entrality. In the circumstance, Indonesia has laid out its version of Indo⁃Pacific vision, which aims to aintain regional peace, create new economic growth centers, and trengthen the governance of non⁃traditional security issues through regional cooperation. Its aims are to maintain ASEAN’s centrality and unity.In view of this, China need to uphold the concept of inclusiveness and openness which ASEAN advocates,encourage third⁃market cooperation with Japan, India, and other countries, and to promote the development of  reional order in the direction of mutual benefit rather than “zero⁃sum”, by means of dialogue rather than  confrontation.

The failure of the 2019 Hanoi Summit following the 2018 Singapore Summit demonstrates the grave difference on the path and the goal of denuclearization between the US and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The two countries find themselves entrapped in the dilemma that if they fail to find a compromising and breakthrough point, the nuclear issue will remain unsolved for a rather long time,which will be the second worst option for both the US and the DPRK. As for China and South Korea, they will face an unfavorable situation so long as DPRK maintains its nuclearized status. In the future, there are variables for development: whether the DPRK will have a new and bolder roadmap for expanding the scope of dismantling nuclear facilities; the DPRK's ability against economic sanction; should the US intensifies the sanction, the DPRK might break the promise of suspending nuclear activities and resume some sort of nuclear and missile development; finally, the US might propose alternative plans for DPRK⁃US denuclearization talks if prospects are dim in terms of so⁃called Final, Fully Verified Denuclearization(FFVD).

Based on the principle of the interaction between productivity and production relations, the article takes the interaction between domestic and international forces as the dimension, and takes the core ele⁃ments of international relations as a reference. Therefore, the author seeks to explore the interaction between national strength and the world order which are separately reflecting the domestic and international production mode. That exploration will provide the era background analysis of Marxist international strategy with discourse features. This paper proposes that the national strength and the world order jointly influence the era background of the international strategy, and the essence of Marxist international strategy is to recognize and transform the interaction between the state and the world, especially national strength, world order and the theme of the times they constitute. With that, Marxist international strategy will make the overall global landscape much more suitable for the fundamental requirements of the domestic production mode.

In April 2018, the President of People’s Republic of China, Mr. Xi Jinping, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held an informal summit in Wuhan, which makes the first ever informal bilateral summit after the Dong Lang standoff in 2017. They had reached broad consensus on the overarching, long⁃term and strategic issues of global and bilateral importance, symbolizing a “restart” of Sino⁃India relations.However, the “restart” still faces many uncertainties and vulnerabilities. In particular, the real cause for India’s adjustment of its China policy, whether it be tactical or strategic, still needs further observation.The increasingly uncertain international environment, especially the protectionist policy of the Trump administration, has provided new impetus and opportunities for the strategic cooperation between China and India. China and India should take this opportunity to explore the foundation for full strategic cooperation,and make it sustainable the process of “restart”.

Since the USS Lassen Incident in October 2015, the US Navy has been dispatching warships to“intrude” into the adjacent waters of Chinese maritime features in the South China Sea on a regular basis.In the name of so-called “Freedom of Navigation Operations” of the US Navy, such “unauthorized intrusions” actually challenged various maritime claims of China in the South China Sea, and seriously violated China‘s territorial sovereignty in the region. With an empirical approach, the paper analyses the statistics of the US warship's“unauthorized intrusions” in recent years and generalizes features of these operations. The paper finds that these “unauthorized intrusions” mainly target at three categories of maritime claims: the prior authorization of warships into the Chinese territorial sea, the straight baselines of the Xisha Islands, and the legal status of some islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands. An analysis of the cause and significance of these operations concludes that in the foreseeable future, the aforementioned maritime claims of China remain main targets of “unauthorized intrusions”. In addition, it is predicted that the focus of the US operations will be switched to the Xisha Islands as well as the Nansha Islands. Accordingly, the Chinese government must act promptly and effectively so as to forestall further intrusions of US warships.

The Trump administration’s trade war against China has been the most serious challenge facing Sino⁃US relations in recent years. The US⁃China trade war results from multiple factors such as economics, strategy, politics, and the personality of President Trump. With strong economic strength and comparative advantages in Sino⁃US economic and trade relations, the US starts the trade war and pressures China in means of morality, legislation, Chinese identity, technology, alliances, and business entities. China has also taken countermeasures in those corresponding fields, making efforts to bring the US back to the negotiating table. With regard to the process of the trade war, economic and political factors have profoundly shaped the direction of the trade war. On the whole, the political and security spillovers of Sino⁃US economic and trade relations have been reinforced, and it is likely to result in the strategic competition between China and the US, which require serious management by both sides.

The Paris model featured by “bottom⁃up” has started a new era of global climate governance,which, to the fullest extent, unites the multi⁃stakeholder forces beyond the national level. The governing authority of non⁃state actors in climate politics is increasing day by day, which is reflected in the continuous improvement of cognitive influence, monitoring influence, social influence, resources influence, and symbolic influence. The comprehensive “de⁃climate” policy of the Trump Administration pushed non⁃national actors to pursue a local leadership concerning climate governance, and to seek global visibility of local ac tions in the following ways: shaping structural influence by multiple networking partnership; promoting the monitoring influence with agenda setting and host⁃summit diplomacy; strengthening cognitive influence with authoritative and systematic research; and increasing symbolic influence in seizing political opportunity and shaping the collective identity. The rapid rise of non⁃state actors, especially the US ones, has a significant influence on the climate governance pattern in the Post⁃Paris Era. Whether China could cooperate positively with those non⁃state actors and enhance its governance capacity would make a difference to the guiding role that China plays in global climate governance.

“Singapore Test” is a practical issue for China to properly handle the South China Sea dispute.The issue is rooted in Singapore’s sensitiveness to the freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, its balanced diplomacy preference and deep reliance on international norms and organizations. However, Singapore has also taken its toll when posing the test for China. Consequently, limitations of the “Singapore Test” are obvious, and such a test also provides an opportunity for China to rethink and adjust the South China Sea policy. In the future, China should not only actively address the judicial challenge and un ambiguously make claims of interests in South China Sea, but also spare no effort to expand pragmatic cooperation with Singapore and jointly speed up negotiation of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.