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2019 Vol. 27, No. 8  Published: 30 August 2019
US Academia's Perceptions of a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind and China's Strategic Options
GAO Wanglai
2019, 27(8): 1-10  |  Full text (HTML) (1 KB)  | PDF   PDF  (0 KB)  ( 344 )

A community with a shared future for mankind is a toplevel design in Chinas diplomatic strategic thought system, and a key concept to consider when US academia examines and assesses China's diplomacy. Ever since 2013, American scholars have published works to interpret such a diplomatic concept. They argue that a community of shared future for mankind constitutes the core concept in China's diplomacy in the new era. Such a concept was born due to China's rising power, and it reflects China's strategic desire to build a new international order. Practices of the diplomatic concept involve promoting neighbourhood diplomacy, building economic community and participating in global governance. Realism, idealism and security community theories are three dominant theories used by American scholars to examine the idea, which gives rise to different policy prescriptions. China should further strengthen the influence and penetration of this diplomatic idea, use Track Two and unofficial mechanisms to deepen cooperation and communication with the United States, dispel the misunderstanding and prejudices of US scholars with a targeted approach, and explore new paths of Sino-American cooperation.

Building the Security Network: An Analysis of the US Biodefense Plan
XU Zhenwei
2019, 27(8): 11-28  |  Full text (HTML) (1 KB)  | PDF   PDF  (0 KB)  ( 299 )

Biodefense is an important part of the national defense strategy. Since the 9/11 terrorist attack and the anthrax mail incident, the US has attached great importance to the construction and deployment of the biodefense system, with the aim of preventing negative impacts of biological weapon attacks and biotechnology abuse on the US. The US biodefense plan is the national security and public safety plan based on risk prevention and a brand new strategic plan based on the development of bioscience and biotechnology. In view of this, administrations of Bush, Obama and Trump have vigorously implemented the biodefense plan by enacting a large number of legal documents and making financial appropriations, thus providing legal, financial and technical support for the development of the plan. Moreover, with the participation of federal government departments, state and local governments, biotechnology companies and universities, the establishment of federal agencies for antiterrorism activities, as well as the improvement of information system for bioterrorism management, a relatively complete biological defense system and security network are gradually being built. After years of development and reform, American biodefense plan has achieved more significant results and improved its ability to defend against biological threats, but some problems still exist. Valuable reference and lessons could be drawn from the development of American biodefense plan and the construction of the biodefense system.

On the Compulsory Conciliation Systems in UNCLOS: From the Perspective of Chinese Interests
WANG Meili,DU Chenjie
2019, 27(8): 29-41  |  Full text (HTML) (1 KB)  | PDF   PDF  (0 KB)  ( 331 )

As an important part of the dispute settlement mechanism of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the compulsory conciliation system witnesses the compromise of interests competing of various parties at the third conference on the law of the sea. In addition to the compulsory initiation, this system retains advantages of flexibility and controllability of general conciliation, while weaknesses and contradictions still remain. Therefore, once the compulsory conciliation system is applied to related affairs of China, it will give rise to a double-edged impact on China‘s interests. On the whole, seems to be a serious challenge, the compulsory conciliation system actually causes little risk to the engaged parties. As long as it is properly interpreted and handled with a calm attitude, it will not affect China’s interests seriously.

The Clarity of Property Rights and the Provision of Public Goods in the “Belt and Road Initiative”: The Combination Modes of Pure Public Goods and Shared Goods
YANG Jian,ZHENG Yingqin
2019, 27(8): 42-53  |  Full text (HTML) (1 KB)  | PDF   PDF  (0 KB)  ( 332 )

It is the responsibility of China as a major power to provide public goods in building the Belt and Road Initiative. Under the unchanged condition that China remains as a big developing country in the primary stage of socialism, China‘s provision of public goods for countries involved in the Belt and Road Initiative should adopt the dialectical thinking of “doing our best according to our ability”. Based on the clarity of property right, the paper analyzes and classifies “pure public goods” and “shared goods”, and further distinguishes the scope of interests and the limits of responsibility in the provision of public goods, with the aim to provide theoretical insights and practical suggestions for the hierarchical management and multi-dimensional operation of public goods in the Belt and Road Initiative. Theoretically, the provision of public goods with clear property rights, responsibilities and obligations is conducive to narrowing the cognitive gap between supply and demand. Practically, distinguishing shared goods from pure public goods is helpful to enhance the construction of institutions characterized by “extensive consultation, joint construction and benefits sharing”, to improve the multiintegration model of China’s foreign aid, and to deepen its internationalization. It is suggested that while providing pure public goods, China is supposed to develop more multi-structural public products with clear property rights.

Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative from the Perspective of Maritime Regional Cooperation
2019, 27(8): 54-66  |  Full text (HTML) (1 KB)  | PDF   PDF  (0 KB)  ( 355 )

 Maritime regional cooperation has its own unique internal mechanism, for which Marine Regionalism is the theorization and provides an analytical framework. Marine Regionalism covers two layers: the legal basis for regional cooperation in global law of the sea, and the specific cooperation regime in a particular region. There is an interaction mechanism between the two layers and the UN specialized agencies play a pivotal role: the global law promotes the establishment and development of regional cooperation regimes, and regional issues raised by or regional measures adopted by regional cooperation regimes, at the same time, may also promote the evolvement of global law. Taking the Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative as a clue, the paper proposes some thoughts and suggestions on maritime cooperation under the Belt and Road framework from the perspective of the development mechanism and trend of Marine Regionalism. Firstly, China may consider ratifying the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement which provides the legal basis for regional cooperation. Secondly, China should attach importance to the pivotal role of the UN specialized agencies especially the IMO. Thirdly, China can promote regional cooperation in the South China Sea based on the Semienclosed Sea Articles. Fourthly, China may participate in the regional marine cooperation regimes along the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in a bottom-up way.

Multilateral Cooperation under the Polar Silk Road Framework: Opportunities, Challenges and Approaches
JIANG Yinan
2019, 27(8): 67-77  |  Full text (HTML) (1 KB)  | PDF   PDF  (0 KB)  ( 323 )
The “Polar Silk Road”, as an important part of the Belt and Road Initiative, shall transcend the bilateral cooperation between China and Russia into international multilateral cooperation. The needs of the countries along the Belt and Road and the potential peaceful situation in the Korean peninsula are the advantages. Meanwhile, the lack of political mutual trust, the conflicts of laws and the hostility from western countries make it difficult for the realization of the multilateral cooperation. In the future, China should enhance the BRI mechanism to promote the alignment of “Polar Silk Road” with existing governance mechanisms and strategies of the BRI partner countries, and to expand the participation of countries beyond the area, with the aim to lead the Arctic governance into a new stage of multilateral cooperation.
The Obligation of Due Diligence in the Exploitation of International Marine Resources
2019, 27(8): 78-91  |  Full text (HTML) (1 KB)  | PDF   PDF  (0 KB)  ( 410 )

The obligation of due diligence is a customary rule under general international law, which has been enshrined in numerous international treaties and legal documents, while its content and scope remain fragmented. With the accumulation of advisory opinion and judgment of international judicial bodies, such obligations in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has been uncovered, and its content and scope have gradually become clear. The obligation of due diligence is closely related to state responsibility. Nevertheless, as an obligation of conduct, the obligation of due diligence in the process of the exploitation of marine resources does not necessarily incur state responsibility in practice due to the flexible criteria in the application. Accordingly, the negative aspect of this obligation should not be exaggerated, and for those responsible states, the obligation would rather be an incentive. Under the guidance of the ‘strategy of maritime powers’, China should take necessary measures to regulate deep seabed mining activities as well as offshore fishing activities within its jurisdiction or control, so as to display the image of a ‘responsible great power’ in respect of marine environment protection.

Why the Refugee Policy Reform of the Gillard Administration failed
SONG Wei, XU Wen
2019, 27(8): 92-106  |  Full text (HTML) (1 KB)  | PDF   PDF  (0 KB)  ( 326 )

This paper first reviews the evolution of refugee policy from 1973 to 2007. In the 1970s, Australia abolished the “white Australia policy” and began to make new refugee policies in response to the refugee crisis after the Vietnam War. Since then, four administrations, from Fraser to Howard (1975-2007), had adopted strict border control. Notably, the “offshore processing” policy of the Howard government had achieved remarkable results but been blamed for lack of humanitarianism. Kevin Rudd then abolished the policy, but Julia Gillard returned to the increasingly strict refugee asylum policy. The article argues that the refugee policy reform of the Gillard government has its domestic and global background. Secondly, the reform process of Gillard's refugee policy is divided into four stages. Gillard tried to avoid Nauru and PNG for political considerations and pursued reform in the compromise between humanitarianism and national interests. However, she had to restart the “offshore processing” policy after setbacks in the domestic game. Finally, Gillard and the successive administrations formed a consensus on tough refugee policy, and the policy of two parties gradually witnessed a convergence. Faced with the dilemma to choose between humanitarianism and national interests, Australia finally decided on national interests as the priority.

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