As an important connection point for global integration, near space is a military strategic high point for achieving longterm aerial reconnaissance and global precision strikes. Having been affected by the controversy over the delimitation of air space and outer space, the regulatory rules for the near space flights still rely on the domestic legislation of some countries, and effective regulation and coordination have not yet been achieved at the international level. In the context of the legal status of near space undefined, the regulatory subject is unclear, the regulatory object is uncertain, the regulatory content is complex, and flight activities are controversial, and the existing international aerospace legal system is no longer able to meet the practical needs of adjusting such new relationships. Building a targeted regulatory system is not only the foundation for the orderly development of the industry, but also an important guarantee for ensuring national defense security and the development and utilization of near space resources. Therefore, the regulation of near space vehicles requires collaborative efforts from state actors and international organizations. At the domestic legislative level, China can refer to the relevant content of the International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety (IAASS) Study Draft Convention on the Regulation of Near Space, either actively promoting the integration of near space rule into the institutional design of aviation or space law, or formulating a separate near space law. In order to achieve the coordination between ground national safety and existing aerospace activities, the revision of rules is required to focus on regulatory matters such as registration, access permit, and promulgation of near space vehicles, driving international legislation with domestic legislation. From the perspective of global space security governance, the longterm solution to breaking the regulatory deadlock of near space flight activities lies in reaching a specialized international agreement on near space regulation. However, this plan currently faces numerous obstacles from politics, law, technology, and other aspects, and coordinating domestic legislation in various countries has become a potential breakthrough point. At the international legislative level, the International Civil Aviation Organization can play a leading role in promoting international cooperation in the innocent passage of near space, while either revising the relevant annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation or adding new annex standards for near space flights, in order to unify technical standards for near space flight vehicles and promote the construction of international unified rules.

The coconstructing of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an international practice guided by a new concept of global governance, which helps lead and shape a new order of global governance. As an important concept in international political economy studies, the global governance refers to the process of solving global issues by utilizing international mechanisms. Based on the analytical framework of international political economy of the wealthpowersocial purpose nexus, this paper analyses the role of the Belt and Road Initiative in the global governance, and assesses its influence on international order from a different perspective. The aim of this study was to develop a new conceptual framework to better understand the relationship between the BRI and global governance. There are three major findings in this paper. Firstly, the research found that the coconstruction of the BRI has promoted a more balanced division of labor in global value chains, and improved the position of developing countries in international production network and distribution of global wealth. Secondly, the research showed that the BRI has not only strengthened China’s structural power in security, production, finance and knowledge, but also promoted the diffusion and transfer of structural power among participating countries. Thirdly, the research revealed the nature of the BRI, which is committed to help build a global community of shared future, to reverse the recent tendencies of deglobalization, and to form reglobalization. These findings add to a growing body of evidence that suggests the gradual shift of center of global power from west to east, providing deeper insights into how the BRI operates to improve the existing international political and economic structure through policy coordination, connectivity of infrastructure, unimpeded trade, financial integration and peopletopeople ties. Furthermore, in terms of its implementation, the BRI upholds multilateralism with core principle of peaceful coexistence, amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness, calling for the actively adoption of approaches such as dialogue, effective communication and policy coordination to overcome difficulties and challenges in a collective action. As a result, the BRI has helped to increase the voices of developing countries in global governance through the establishment of discursive power over international regimes. More importantly, the BRI offers new solutions for global governance which are both inclusive and pragmatic, featuring Chinese wisdom and Chinese solutions for addressing global issues. In conclusion, the BRI has made a significant contribution to deepening regional cooperation, boosting global economy, and constructing a fairer and more equitable global governance system, which will take humanity to a better future.

Minilateralism prevails when the multilateral process fails to address the challenges and conflicts among major powers. Major countries, including the United States, have exploited minilateralism to gain an advantage over their rivals. In the field of international economy, minilateralism allows a few countries and regions to dominate certain sectors. These countries and regions can then influence the layout of global supply chain and the rules that affect the rest of the world. Minilateralism can be either open or closed. The typical closed minilateralism is evident in many recent U.S.led alliances. These alliances aim to counter and contain China recognized as the main target of the U.S. strategy. They operate on a different track from the principles of nondiscrimination and globalization, and they undermine the multilateral institutions in which cooperation and dialogues are constructed. On the other hand, China still adheres to open minilateralism and true multilateralism, which are more inclusive and respectful of the interests and concerns of all parties. However, China also needs to learn how to use its economic and political power more effectively and responsibly.

Carbon pricing is a marketbased instrument for climate change governance. The existing studies on carbon pricing focus on a specific carbon pricing mechanism, while having less examination of the development of carbon pricing at the macro level. At the macro level, the global carbon pricing has been generally evolving in a fragmented way. It presents a multilevel governance structure without a central regime and there is little coordination and weak connections among various regimes. This fragmentation results from the differentiated development of carbon pricing mechanisms, which, if not effectively controlled, may undermine the efficiency of global emission reduction and damage the global trading system. Currently, there are four possible pathways to address the fragmentation of global carbon pricing, namely the carbon pricing mechanism linkage, unilateral extension of the carbon market, climate clubs and multilateralism. The international community should stick to the idea of multilateral governance with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) governance process as the core, apply a combination of the bottomup approach and the topdown approach to the governance, adopt a governance approach that addresses both the problems and their root causes, and further improve the multilateral way.

Abstract： After the invalidation of the Privacy Shield, the EU and the U.S. established the Data Privacy Framework in late 2022 to restore the order of crossborder data flow between them. The Data Privacy Framework was designed to address the main concerns raised by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the Schrems II case, and the European Commission issued a decision on the adequate level of protection of personal data based on the framework in July 2023. However, the Data Privacy Framework has failed to impose significant constraints on the capabilities of the U.S. intelligence agencies to conduct largescale data collection and mass surveillance. Additionally, the twotier relief mechanism does not provide adequate and effective relief to the EU citizens whose data privacy rights are violated in the U.S. due to a lack of independence. In fact, the Data Privacy Framework doesn’t make an essential breakthrough compared to the Privacy Shield. On the surface, the divergence in the arrangement of the crossborder data flow between the EU and the U.S. is a collision of two different concepts and governance models of data protection, reflecting the fundamental conflict of interest between the European digital sovereignty and the U.S. maintenance of digital hegemony. The two sides are competing for the right to speak on global data governance in the era of digital economy by virtue of their respective advantages. The competition between the EU and the U.S. over the Data Privacy Framework offers valuable insights for China in selecting an appropriate model of data supervision and enhancing its influence in the field of rules of data governance.

Carbon emission reduction in maritime transportation requires the integrated application of various measures, including the marketbased mechanism (MBM). Although the EU’s unilateral application of maritime carbon trading system may have a positive effect on the construction of the marketbased mechanism in the maritime field, it is not in line with China’s shipping interests due to its neglect of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. China should join hands with other nonEU countries to oppose the EU’s unilateral measures and actively promote the construction of the multilateral marketbased mechanism at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) level, so as to promote the realization of fair and equitable transformation of maritime carbon emission. Meanwhile, at the domestic level, based on the guidance of promoting the domestic and abroad governance in an integrated manner, China needs to provide legal basis for the implementation of the maritime marketbased mechanism.

While making difference in the field of environmental governance on high seas, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) faces difficulties in its application from the perspective of theory and practice. In theory, there is a controversy in the legal nature of the CBDR. The elements of this principle remain unclear, and it is also uncertain whether there are exceptions to it. In practice, the CBDR applies to controls and management of ocean acidification, plastic pollution and persistent organic pollutants on the high seas, and the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological resources beyond national jurisdiction. However, the differentiated responsibilities seem to be ignored or weakened and it appears to be difficult for the developing countries to take the common responsibilities. The causes of the above dilemmas are the outdated poweroriented approach to the high seas governance and the low standard for defining the differentiated responsibilities for high seas environmental governance. In practice, the reasons for the abovementioned dilemmas are a lack of the international community to fully consider the differentiated responsibilities of developing countries, a difficulty in determining the historical responsibilities of each country and the weak willingness of the developed countries to assume differentiated responsibilities for technology transfer and financial support and tend to weaken differentiated responsibilities. At the theoretical level, it is important to clarify that the CBDR should be regarded as a legal principle in the environmental governance on the high seas. And it is very important to improve the classification of countries of differentiated responsibilities, improve the specific formation of differentiated responsibilities and insist on substantial equity. In practice, it is recommended to consider the demands of the developing countries in the field of maritime emission reduction and fully implement the CBDR in other controls and measures of the ocean acidification. It is also important to emphasize and apply the CBDR within the negotiations of the Plastic Treaty, optimize financial support and technical assistance in the control of persistent organic pollutants and actively promote the capacity building and marine technology transfer mechanism of the Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement.